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Abstract: 
A key question for evidence-based medicine (EBM) is how best to model the way in which 
EBM should “[integrate] individual clinical expertise and the best external evidence” 
(Sackett et al. 1996). We argue that the formulations and models available in the literature 
today are modest variations on a common theme and face very similar problems. For 
example, both the early and updated models of evidence-based clinical decisions presented 
in Haynes, Devereaux and Guyatt (2002) assume (with Sackett, et. al., 1996) that EBM 
consists of, among other things, evidence from clinical research and clinical expertise. On 
this A-view, EBM describes all that goes on in a specific justifiable medical decision. There 
is, however, an alternative interpretation of EBM, the B-view, in which EBM describes just 
one component of the decision situation (a component usually based on evidence from 
clinical research) and in which, together with other types of evidence, EBM leads to a 
justifiable clincial decision but does not describe the decision itself. This B-view is 
inspired by a 100-years older version of EBM, a Swedish standard requiring medical 
decision-making and practice to be in accordance with ‘science and proven experience’. In 
the paper we outline how the Swedish concept leads to an improved understanding of the 
way in which scientific evidence and clinical experience can and cannot be integrated in 
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light of EBM. In addition the paper sketches the as yet unexplored historical background to 
EBM. 
1. Introduction 
 
EBM is actually only a reformulation of the motto ‘science and proven experience’ 
(Werkö et al. 2002, 3478, our translation) 
 
Globally, evidence-based medicine (EBM) is favoured in the public sector. In Sweden a 
bipartite, partly overlapping standard that is more than 100 years older than EBM applies 
in the public sector and parts of the private sector as well. This Swedish standard requires 
decision-making and practice to be based on both science and proven experience, or 
vetenskap och beprövad erfarenhet (VBE), and indeed leading Swedish physicians often 
think of EBM as a reformulation of the Swedish standard. Lars Werkö, “the icon beyond 
all comparison in Swedish health care” (Hont 2009) is a clear example (e.g. see Werkö et 
al. 2002 above). Since its first legal application in Swedish health care in the late 1800s, 
the VBE standard has been pressed into service in law and public policy in areas as diverse 
as medicine and health care, education, environmental risk assessment, veterinary care and 
social work. We shall focus on the application of VBE in medicine (VBE-M).  
 
The Swedish concept of VBE-M helps us to understand the ways in which scientific 
evidence and clinical experience both can and cannot be integrated within EBM. The 
similarities and dissimilarities between VBE-M and EBM shed light on the capacity of 
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EBM to “[integrate] individual clinical expertise and the best external evidence” (Sackett 
et al. 1996). This most influential and elusive ambition of EBM (Sackett et al. 1996) is the 
primary focus of the current paper. In addition, however, VBE-M helps to bring out the 
historical background to EBM.  
2. EBM and VBE-M: Similarities and dissimilarities 
Prima facie it makes sense to compare EBM and VBE-M. (1) Both introduce evidentiary 
standards for decision-making (not a standard for science as such). (2) Each promotes the 
goal of making more use of science and sound evidence in practical decision-making. But 
(3) the two approaches diverge, on the surface at least, when it comes to the types of 
evidence that should be allowed to influence practical decision-making. 
 
(1) EBM highlights the decision-making context. It is primarily about the professions and 
the connection between the academic disciplines and the professions; only by implication 
is it about the disciplines themselves. Several of the leading articles on EBM were 
published in the British Medical Journal, which has the slogan: helping doctors make 
better decisions. Rosenberg’s and Donald’s well-known 1995 BMJ paper is entitled 
“Evidence based medicine: an approach to clinical problem-solving”. 
 
Similarly, in Swedish law VBE is the gold standard for decision-making and practice, 
especially in health care (VBE-M). For example, VBE-M states that medical practice must 
be based on science and proven experience. Health care workers who do not provide care 
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in accordance with VBE-M can be criticized by the Health and Social Care Inspectorate 
and even be held responsible according to penal law. VBE also helps to define patients’ 
rights to reimbursement for expenses associated with treatments in other European 
countries. The legislative use of science and proven experience illustrates that the notion is 
intended for policy-making and practical decision-making.  
  
(2) To a large extent EBM focuses on the need to make more, and better, use of research 
findings in clinical decision-making: 
  
Evidence based medicine is the process of systematically finding, appraising, and 
using contemporaneous research findings as the basis for clinical decisions. For 
decades people have been aware of the gaps between research evidence and clinical 
practice, and the consequences in terms of expensive, ineffective, or even harmful 
decision making. Inexpensive electronic databases and widespread computer 
literacy now give doctors access to enormous amounts of data. Evidence based 
medicine is about asking questions, finding and appraising the relevant data, and 
harnessing that information for everyday clinical practice. (Rosenberg and Donald 
1995) 
  
The focus, claims (Eddy 2005, 14) , “is on educating physicians to help them bring more 
research and evidence into their individual decisions about individual patients.” The same 
goes for VBE-M. However, before we proceed it should be noted that, in health care at 
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least, the Swedish notion is not explicitly defined in any official documents. One will 
search in vain for suitable stipulations to guide applications of the laws in which the 
expression occurs. Hence its characteristics have to be inferred from its many applications, 
i.e. its use and history. We will therefore present a sketch of the history of VBE-M (and to 
a lesser extent EBM).  
  
It was probably no accident that the Swedish concept emerged in health care regulations in 
the late 1800s (the concept itself is, at least, somewhat older; almost exactly the same 
formulation occurs in the oath that were taken by those who were awarded the licentiate 
degree in medicine in Uppsala, Lund, and Stockholm from 1829 and onwards). It is 
sometimes argued that the mid-1800s were dominated by lack of confidence in the 
therapeutic methods available in Sweden and elsewhere. Scholarly work referring to this 
period uses terms such as “doubt disease” (Fåhræus 1950, 98), “therapeutic nihilism” 
(Danek 1969, 65), “the bankruptcy of therapy”, and “crisis in medical self-confidence” 
(Stolt 1994, Chapters 4 and 5). Mid-1800s advances in basic medical science did not reach 
practitioners and were generally of little therapeutic consequence (Porter 1995), and this 
was especially so, perhaps, for the typical Swedish countryside doctor: 
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Practitioners in the countryside used trial and error, and as late as 1850 they had 
little use of medical science in their everyday practice. (Stolt 1994, 159, our 
translation)1 
 
Trust in medicine as taught by the universities decreased. Quackery had been an alternative 
for long in Sweden, and it is reported that in the 19th century it was equally natural to seek 
help from a “wise woman” as it is to visit the doctor today (Ling 2004, 21). The period is 
referred to by Swedish scholars ironically as ‘the golden era of public distrust and humbug 
medicine’ (Fåhræus 1950, 102). 
  
Whatever the connection might have been medical science advanced rapidly during the 
second half of the 1800s: from Louis Pasteur’s 1859 suggestion that microorganisms may 
cause many human and animal diseases, Joseph Lister’s 1867 publication “On the 
Antiseptic Principle in the Practice of Surgery”, showing that disinfection reduces post-
operative infections, to Robert Koch’s 1882-1883 isolations of the microorganism 
responsible for tuberculosis and cholera. In short, in Sweden the decades before the 
regulation was put in place involved several breakthroughs in medical science; it was a 
time when medical science, finally, advanced to a position from which it could actually 
prove useful to medical practice. It is indeed interesting that those who explain the 
                                                
1 Approximate translation of the Swedish original: “[Landsortspraktikerna] prövade sig 
fram, och ännu runt 1850 hade de förvånansvärt liten nytta av de medicinska teorierna i sin 
vardag.” 
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emergence of EBM also refer to medical breakthroughs in the late 1800s: “The 100-year 
period between 1885 and 1985 brought amazing medical breakthroughs” (Howick 2011, 
11). 
 
It makes sense to ponder what happened in Finland during this period. For centuries – until 
1809 – Finland and Sweden were joined. Considerable overlap with regard to the 
requirement of science and proven experience between the two countries would come as no 
surprise. The Medical Society of Finland2 (Finska läkaresällskapet) was founded in 1835 
with the dual purpose of developing medical science and health care. It was followed by 
The Finnish Medical Society (Duodecim) in 1881, which aimed to develop medical science 
and practice in Finland.3 Nowadays the overwhelming majority of Finnish physicians who 
are members of The Finnish Medical Association (Lääkäriliitto), founded in 1910, are 
committed to treating patients in accordance with science and proven experience through 
the code of medical ethics approved by the association’s delegate committee (Lääkäriliitto 
                                                
2 We are unsure whether there is an official English translation, but “The Medical Society 
of Finland” is sometimes used when Finska läkaresällskapet is referred to in English 
contexts. 
3 The Medical Society of Finland was set up specifically for the Swedish speaking 
community of practice, whereas the explicit aim of Duodecim was to promote medical 
practice and uptake of medical science in Finnish. A third society, Suomen Lääkäriliitto 
(The Finnish Medical Association), was established in 1910. Many thanks to Matti 
Sintonen for generously helping us to navigate the various medical associations of Finland. 
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2014). Moreover, it is a legal requirement in Finland since 1994 that all health care 
personnel should only apply methods that there is proven experience of (since 2000 the 
same requirement holds for those in veterinary care).4 Much of the development leading to 
the current role of VBE in Finland has happened after 1809. Thus the overlap is not a mere 
historical artefact. So what we refer to as the Swedish concept has a perfect match in 
Finland, although it is much more widespread in its Swedish applications. The motivation 
                                                
4 Lag om yrkesutbildade personer inom hälso- och sjukvården (1994/559) §15: ”En 
yrkesutbildad person inom hälso- och sjukvården skall i sin yrkesutövning tillämpa allmänt 
godtagna och beprövade metoder enligt sin utbildning, som han hela tiden skall försöka 
komplettera. I samband med yrkesutövningen skall en yrkesutbildad person inom hälso- 
och sjukvården opartiskt beakta den nytta och de eventuella olägenheter den medför för 
patienten.” See also Lag om utövning av veterinäryrket (2000/29) §13. Läkarens etiska 
regler, accepted by Suomen Lääkäriliitto (The Finnish Medical Association) in 1988 states 
in §V that: ”Läkaren skall upprätthålla och förkovra sina kunskaper och sitt kunnande och 
han skall endast rekommendera undersökningar och behandlingar som i enlighet med 
medicinsk vetenskap och beprövad erfarenhet anses effektiva och ändamålsenliga” (Saarni 
2006, 11). A closely similar formulation occurs in the latest version of the codex, approved 
2014 (see Lääkäriliitto 2014). The English translation of the relevant passage reads: ”A 
physician shall maintain and improve his knowledge and skills.  He shall use and 
recommend only such examinations and therapies which medical knowledge and 
experience have shown to be effective and purposeful” 
https://www.laakariliitto.fi/en/ethics/. 
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behind the requirement in Finland is arguably the same as in Sweden since the two 
countries had so much in common during the concept’s pre-history.5 
 
In fact, moving outside of the strict domain of VBE-M one could claim that VBE is a 
Nordic concept. For instance, since 1998 psychologists in the Nordic countries are 
committed to VBE through Yrkesetiska principer för psykologer i Norden. These principles 
state: ”Psykologen arbetar i enlighet med vetenskap och beprövad erfarenhet och 
eftersträvar en kontinuerlig professionell utveckling genom att inhämta mer och ny 
kunskap om den vetenskapliga och yrkesmässiga utvecklingen.” 
(Sveriges_Psykologförbund 1998, 6)6  
 
Certainly, it was not only in the Nordic countries that it was acknowledged, around 1890, 
that medical science ought to guide medical decision-making. Failure to consider medical 
science in the medical profession was criticized in The Boston Medical and Surgical 
Journal too: 
  
… medical art without science is not only unprogressive, but almost inevitably 
becomes quackery. As soon as we treat our patients by rule of thumb, by tradition, 
                                                
5 It hasn’t been possible to track the pre-history with sufficient certainty and 
accuracy within this project – at least not so far – but there appears to be similar 
ideas in 1800 century writings by, for instance, the father of pediatrics in Sweden, 
Nils Rosén; moreover, a predecessor from 1733 resembles in some respects the 
1829 oath we have referred to above (Eklöf 2000). 
6  
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by dogmas, or by metaphysical axioms, we do injury to ourselves as well as to 
them. (Pye-Smith 1900, 173) 
  
Still, if we (simplistically) compare occurrences of the expression “science” (“vetenskap”) 
with occurrences of the expression “experience” (“erfarenhet”) in sources such as The 
Transactions of The Medical Society of Finland7 (Finska läkaresällskapets handlingar) in 
the latter half of the 1800s we immediately find that, whereas quite a few reports contain 
the word “experience”, there is less mention of “science”. Hence it is understandable that 
further measures, such as the requirement of VBE-M, were put in place to ensure that 
doctors made more use of science in practice. 
 
There is arguably a similar story to be told about the emergence of EBM exactly 100 years 
later. Here both Guyatt and Sackett report on the need to be sceptical vis-à-vis received 
medical wisdom (Howick 2011, chapter 2). 
  
(3) However, it seems that experience of a specific kind – proven experience – was also 
identified as important as a result of the arrival of VBE-M. Somewhat paradoxically it 
seems that the development of relevant scientific evidence was accompanied by a 
corresponding development (or upgrading, or rating-up) in the role of evidence of a certain 
kind from experience as well. This is the third relevant comparison point between EBM 
                                                
7 There is, as far as we know, no official translation of Finska läkaresällskapets handlingar 
into English. 
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and VBE-M. Looking at the recent introduction of science and proven experience in the 
Swedish Educational Act (2010:800), we can see that Swedish schools and education 
authorities have developed a growing interest in proven experience. In particular, these 
discussions highlight the evidential relevance of experience within the professional 
collective. A third comparison between EBM and VBE-M can therefore be based on the 
way they deal with the relationship between two different types of evidence: evidence that 
is ‘scientific’ and evidence that is ‘experienced based’.  
 
Whether the prominence of proven experience is to be counted as a similarity between 
EBM and VBE-M depends on whether EBM and VBE-M have the same effect of rating up 
experience of the proven kind. We are ready to argue that they do, but this assessment 
depends on an assumption few advocates of EBM endorse. The assumption is that there is 
no strong link between EBM and science – or rather that the link, such as it is, is no 
stronger than that connecting EBM and proven experience.8 In other words, the scientific 
classification here is not straightforwardly guaranteed by the use of certain methods or 
methodologies recommended by EBM such as, for example, randomised controlled trials. 
Much of what is regarded as being at the core of EBM could then equally well be classified 
as proven experience. To the extent that this assumption is accepted there is reason to think 
that EBM would simply prioritize experience of a certain kind. Advocates of EBM might 
                                                
8 For a related observation, see (Stoyanov, Machamer, and Shaffner 2012, 150): “In fact, 
they do nothing else but retell us the fragmented individual narrative, but presented in an 
ostensibly scientifically structured manner.” 
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be dissatisfied with that implication because they wish to preserve the link between basic 
science and clinical research: 
      
Evidence-based medicine focuses on these systematic studies simply because they 
represent the most advanced stages of testing to ascertain whether the innovations 
of basic science work, how well they work, and for whom they work when applied 
in the clinical setting. Thus, evidence-based medicine is not in competition with 
basic science; rather it depends on it and builds on it. (Haynes et al. 1996, 196-97) 
 
A clear dissimilarity – no matter how EBM is construed with respect to science and proven 
experience – would be that EBM downgrades certain kinds of science, such as science that 
is not based on RCTs (e.g. cohort studies), but this is not the case with VBE-M, at least not 
explicitly. In the next section we will look more closely at the way EBM and VBE-M 
handle the notion of evidence. 
 
A further dissimilarity between EBM and VBE-M can be detected. The meaning of VBE-
M varies with context among medical practitioners. (Persson and Wahlberg 2015) reports 
that the BE (or proven experience) component is sometimes taken to report a property of 
doctors and sometimes used to refer to a fact about how seriously a therapy has been tested 
in practice. By contrast, EBM seems fixed. Indeed if it were not fixed it would be difficult 
to understand the need for instruments such as the Grading of Recommendations 
Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE) framework. GRADE is a framework 
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for synthesizing and rating the quality of evidence, and for providing clinical practice 
guidelines addressing alternative management options. It is used by many important actors 
in health care all over the world, including WHO and the Cochrane Collaboration. 
 
To the extent that EBM introduces a new paradigm – see, for instance, Evidence Based 
Medicine Working Group (1992) – it ought to follow that something of fundamental 
importance remains fixed through various applications of EBM. Our hypothesis is that the 
primary candidate for this static role is the EBM position on evidence (see next section, 
and (Howick 2011, 4)). 
  
3. EBM and VBE-M: The question of evidence 
There is a clear sense in which medicine must always be based on some kind of evidence. 
If evidence is merely a ground for belief, there will not be anything new about EBM. The 
“evidence” in EBM, and in the “science/vetenskap” (V) and “proven experience/beprövad 
erfarenhet” (BE) of VBE-M, is all about what medical practitioners, or policy makers, can 
justifiably base their decisions on. 
 
EBM is a procedure, or approach, that ensures, or perhaps maximises, justifiable decisions. 
VBE-M, as it stands, is a criterion for evaluating whether a decision is warrantable. This 
does not entail that VBE is only put to use post hoc. VBE can be used prospectively, too, 
as can be seen from the discussions in the Journal of the Swedish Medical Association 
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cited in (Persson and Wahlberg 2015) and in the oath taken by Finnish physicians – which 
requires that one to tries to advance proven experience in one’s field.  
  
So, what is this evidence that makes EBM different from medicine practised before 1990? 
There are two suggestions, both present in the prehistory of EBM. Archie Cochrane wrote 
in 1972: 
 
It is surely a great criticism of our profession that we have not organised a critical 
summary, by specialty or subspecialty, adapted periodically, of all relevant 
randomised controlled trials. (quoted from Sønbø Kristiansen and Mooney 2004, 2)  
 
The first is that EBM builds on the principle that all relevant evidence should be taken into 
account. 
 
The second is that EBM builds on an idea of levels of evidence which not only identifies 
but also ranks the relevant kinds of evidence. For Cochrane in 1972 it was randomised 
controlled trials that constituted the relevant level. In the case of EBM, the Oxford Centre 
for Evidence-Based Medicine (CEBM) presents a comprehensive list of levels of evidence 
for different clinical questions. For therapy/prevention these are, from the top down: 
systematic review of RCTs, individual RCTs (all or none), systematic reviews of cohort 
studies, individual cohort studies, “outcomes” research, ecological studies, individual case-
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control studies, case series, and last, expert opinions either without explicit critical 
appraisal or based on physiology, bench research or “first principles” (CEBM 2009).  
 
It is obvious that evidence from basic medical science (physiological processes) and 
institutional or individual experience are not held in high regard.9 The evidence on which 
decisions should be based is that deriving from clinical research. This evidence has high 
predictive value. An early presentation of EBM from the Evidence Based Medicine 
Working Group (1992), states that: 
 
Evidence-based medicine de-emphasizes intuition, unsystematic clinical 
experience, and pathophysiologic rationale as sufficient grounds for clinical 
decision making and stresses the examination of evidence from clinical research. 
(EBMWG 1992, 2420) 
 
Given this understanding of evidence, which is clearly based on clinical research, the 
question becomes what to do about clinical experience. Needless to say, clinical experience 
is often decisive for predictive purposes (see, for instance, Cartwright and Hardie 2012).  
 
                                                
9 Holly Andersen provides an interesting argument explaining why this is the case 
(Andersen 2012). In general the fact that our bodies are complex evolved systems makes it 
likely that relevant variables will be masked. 
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It is certainly plausible to say that EBM cannot be based solely on evidence from clinical 
research. Results from clinical research are not always there to be had, and where they are 
unavailable unsystematized clinical experience can be used as evidence:  
 
... systematic attempts to record observations in a reproducible and unbiased 
fashion markedly increase the confidence one can have in knowledge about patient 
prognosis, the value of diagnostic tests, and the efficacy of treatment. In the 
absence of systematic observation one must be cautious in the interpretation of 
information derived from clinical experience and intuition, for it may at times be 
misleading. (EBMWG 1992, 2421) 
 
 
This is not the situation with regard to VBE-M. Good therapeutic decision-making rests, 
according to VBE-M, on two evidential sources – science and proven experience. In EBM, 
by contrast, acknowledgement of the importance of clinical experience as evidence seems 
to be limited to cases where there are no relevant research findings. 
 
This way of conceiving of EBM might not be shared by Swedish doctors. Trained as they 
are in thinking about VBE-M, it is natural for Swedish practitioners to assume that EBM 
has a place for BE as evidence, too (EBM replaces, as it were, the older idea of science 
(V), in VBE): 
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It is a misunderstanding to assume that EBM no longer involves what we have 
called ‘proven experience’ … The right way to use personal experience is to 
contrast experience against the literature when a current problem is analysed. 
(Werkö et al. 2002, 3478-79, our translation)10  
 
(Indeed, Professor Lars Werkö was one of the leading Swedish physicians. He became 
president of the Swedish Medical Society and ended his career as director of SBU (Hont 
2009)) 
However, as we shall argue in the next section, the combination of EBM and BE is 
sometimes problematic. EBM’s take on evidence, in what appears to be the most common 
version of EBM internationally (the A-views subsection, see below), is too restrictive to 
allow for full incorporation of BE. 
4. EBM and VBE-M: Integrating science and experience 
In an influential statement of EBM by Sackett et al. (1996) it is clear from the subtitle of 
the paper that individual clinical expertise is also important in EBM: 
  
Evidence based medicine: what it is and what it isn’t 
It’s about integrating individual clinical expertise and the best external evidence 
                                                
10 Det är ett missförstånd att tro att EBM inte längre skulle röra det vi kallat ‘beprövad 
erfarenhet’. … Den rätta användningen av den egna erfarenheten borde vara att i samband 
med analys av ett aktuellt problem ställa erfarenheten mot vad litteraturen visar. 
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However, in connection with EBM it is sometimes unclear whether this integration means 
(A) that EBM consists of several parts, with evidence from clinical research being one part 
and clinical expertise being another, or (B) that EBM is one part of the total decision 
situation, with such things as clinical experience and patient preferences being other 
components. (Eddy 2005) introduces a somewhat similar distinction between evidence-
based medicine and evidence-based guidelines, arguing that the former concept is built 
around individuals (decision-makers as well as patients) but could usefully be widened so 
as to include the latter phenomenon (often including multi-disciplinary teams). Our point, 
however, is that the A-view is “internally” problematic. 
4.1 A-views 
(A) is clearly the more common version of EBM. A number of introductions to EBM 
present flow charts like that in Figure 1: 
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Figure 1: The A-view, adapted from 
http://guides.mclibrary.duke.edu/c.php?g=158201&p=1036021 (downloaded 1-Feb 2016) 
 
An influential position paper remarks that: 
 
Initially, evidence-based medicine focused mainly on determining the best research 
evidence relevant to a clinical problem or decision and applying that evidence to 
resolve the issue. This early formulation de-emphasised traditional determinants of 
clinical decisions, including physiological rationale and individual clinical 
experience. (Haynes, Devereaux, and Guyatt 2002) 
 
These remarks concern the very first EBM-formulations. Sackett et al. (1996) is conceived 
as the original attempt to integrate evidence and clinical experience in a better way. Sackett 
et al. (1996) seemingly advocate a version of the A-view. The position paper continues: 
20 
 
Evidence based medicine is the conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current 
best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients. The practice 
of evidence based medicine means integrating individual clinical expertise with the 
best available external clinical evidence from systematic research. (Haynes, 
Devereaux, and Guyatt 2002) 
 
 
According to this statement, EBM includes both evidence and clinical experience. EBM 
does not complement clinical experience; it includes it. However, it should be noted that 
Sackett et al. (1996) discuss evidence only in connection with external clinical experience, 
which is to say research. (Haynes, Devereaux, and Guyatt 2002) picture the position in 
Sackett et al. (1996) in a way that makes it very similar to the A-view shown in Figure 1 
above. 
 
It is said that the “concepts of evidence-based medicine are evolving as limitations of 
earlier models are addressed” (Haynes, Devereaux, and Guyatt 2002). However, in our 
view this has not led to the abandonment of the A-view. That view is perhaps even more 
clearly relied on in later formulations of EBM – e.g. in what is often presented as the 
“contemporary definition”: 
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… the integration of the best research evidence with clinical expertise and patient 
values. (Sackett et al. 2000, 71)  
 
Now, as we have already touched upon, the A-view makes it difficult to talk about 
evidence as something other than research evidence. As (Haynes, Devereaux, and Guyatt 
2002) puts it: 
 
Evidence-based medicine recognises that such evidence is not “created equal” and 
provides detailed guides for finding the most rigorous and pertinent evidence for a 
specific clinical decision. 
 
As a consequence the use of clinical experience as evidence has been downplayed in later 
developments of EBM, and clinical experience is nowadays almost exclusively mentioned 
as that which is needed to implement scientific evidence in a specific decision context. An 
example of this is the entry on “Making a decision” on the CEBM website, www.cebm.net. 
Here, a decision is made by: 
 
Incorporating the findings of valid, important and applicable research with your 
patient values and preferences and your clinical expertise to arrive at the right 
decision about their individual health care. (CEBM 2016)  
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Duke University Medical Center, from whose work we adapted the flow chart in Figure 1, 
presents the issues in a similar way: 
 
The evidence, by itself, does not make the decision, but it can help support the 
patient care process. The full integration of these three components into clinical 
decisions enhances the opportunity for optimal clinical outcomes and quality of 
life. (http://guides.mclibrary.duke.edu/c.php?g=158201&p=1036021 (downloaded 
1-Feb 2016)) 
 
In other words, the original idea behind EBM highlights the need to integrate research 
findings with individual clinical expertise, but on the A-view it is clear that this integration 
cannot be one in which two types of evidence are integrated, since that would violate 
EBM’s paradigmatic view of evidence. Remaining within the paradigm might work in 
some cases, for certain types of clinical experience (proven experience of a certain kind), 
but normally the difference between evidence from the two sources would be too 
pronounced for anything but research evidence to count, according to EBM. This creates 
considerable tension within A-views, since they also wish to acknowledge the role of other 
kinds of “information”: 
 
We title this component of clinical decisions ‘research evidence’ to distinguish it 
from other forms of information that have always been part of clinical decisions, 
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such as the patient’s history, physical findings, diagnostic tests, circumstances, and 
stated preferences. (Haynes, Devereaux, and Guyatt 2002) 
 
4.2 B-views 
The B-view, where EBM is one part of the total decision situation, also has advocates. It is 
perhaps not surprising that Swedish perspectives sometimes express B-views, since these 
are much easier to interpret in terms of VBE. For example, in a much quoted passage in a 
letter to a physician, the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare explains: 
 
In the exercise of her profession, the medical doctor must take account of both 
science and proven experience. [...] When a new method is introduced, proven 
experience of it is trivially lacking, and the scientific evidence can suffice for 
acceptance […]. At other times, long clinical experience might be the dominating 
evidence in favour of accepting the medical treatment whereas theoretical and/or 
experimental evidence for its effectiveness might be lacking.  
 
(Asplund 2001) presents a picture captured in the following flow chart: 
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Figure 2: The B-view, modified from Asplund (2001) 
 
The B-view is not a uniquely Swedish phenomenon. For instance, Haynes et al. 1996, p. 
196, defines evidence-based medicine thus: 
 
Evidence-based medicine is the conscientious and judicious use of current best 
evidence from clinical care research in the management of individual patients. 
 
At first blush this definition seems very similar to those we have referred to as A-views, 
and that is probably how it was intended to be presented. Here too, however, it might be 
argued that EBM is but one part of a larger decision context, the management of individual 
patients. But this is not normally how proponents of EBM picture it. They distinguish 
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between early and updated models (Haynes, Devereaux, and Guyatt 2002), and this would 
be one of the earliest – a model that “de-emphasised traditional determinants of clinical 
decisions, including physiological rationale and individual clinical experience.” The 
alternative B-view reading would be that the early models present EBM as one component 
of the decision. 
 
On a B-view it is much easier to understand EBM and its evidential levels. “The doctor as 
clinician” (see Figure 2) can bring evidence into the decision as well, but it is not the type 
of evidence EBM speaks of, which concerns research findings only. On the A-view the 
clinician’s expertise is only a means of applying research evidence to a particular case. 
That expertise does not provide any additional evidence. On the B-view, by contrast, the 
individual and collective clinical experience that the clinician adds to the decision basis 
qualifies as relevant evidence too. Consequently, according to the B-view EBM does not 
really set a standard for decision-making (see above). Its capacity to help doctors make 
better decisions is clearly weakened. EBM becomes much more of a partial tool for 
decision-making than advocates of EBM normally assume. 
  
4. Concluding remarks 
Advocates of EBM struggle to model the way evidence-based medicine should “[integrate] 
individual clinical expertise and the best external evidence” (Sackett et al. 1996). We have 
argued that the formulations and models available in the literature today are variations on a 
common theme. On these A-views EBM describes all that goes on in a specific justifiable 
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medical decision. A-views inevitably create tensions in the concept of evidence they 
require. 
  
For that reason alone B-views are of interest. On a B-view EBM describes just one 
component of the decision situation (a component usually based on evidence from clinical 
research). Together with other types of evidence, EBM leads to a justifiable clincial 
decision, but it does not describe the decision itself. The B-view is inspired by a 100-years 
older version of EBM, a Swedish standard that requires medical decision-making and 
practice to be consistent with ‘science and proven experience’.  
 
In sum, the Swedish concept of ‘science and proven experience’ clearly resonates with 
several characteristics of evidence-based medicine. Like EBM it focuses on evidence 
(rather than opinion), on science, and on the need for integration. 
 
However, the Swedish concept also differs from the concept of evidence-based medicine in 
that it clearly identifies two sources of evidence as special: science (vetenskap) and proven 
experience (beprövad erfarenhet). Comparing EBM and VBE, one is struck by the relative 
clarity of the Swedish notion. 
[Acknowledgements to be inserted after review] 
 
27 
References  
"Patient Safety Act (2010:659)." 
2010:800, Skollagen. Stockholm: Norstedts juridik. 
Andersen, Holly. 2012. "Mechanisms: what are they evidence for in evidence-based 
medicine?"  Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18:992-999. 
Asplund, Kjell. 2001. "Den evidensbaserade medicinen är nödvändig men inte tillräcklig:  
Bör kompletteras inom områden där det vetenskapliga underlaget är svagt."  
Läkartidningen 98 (37):3898-3901. 
Cartwright, Nancy, and Jeremy Hardie. 2012. Evidence-based policy – a practical guide to 
doing it better. New York: Oxford University Press. 
CEBM. 2009. "Oxford Centre for Evidence-based Medicine – Levels of Evidence (March 
2009)." Accessed 2016 February 25. http://www.cebm.net/oxford-centre-evidence-
based-medicine-levels-evidence-march-2009/. 
CEBM. 2016. "Making a Decision." Accessed 2016 February 25. 
http://www.cebm.net/category/ebm-resources/tools/making-a-decision/. 
Danek, K. 1969. "Towards a history of health." In Nordisk medicinhistorisk årsbok. 
EBMWG. 1992. "Evidence-based medicine. A new approach to teaching the practice of 
medicine."  JAMA 268 (17):2420-2425. 
Eddy, David M. 2005. "Evidence-based medicine: A unified approach."  Health Affairs 24 
(1):9-17. 
Eklöf, Motzi. 2000. Läkarens Ethos: Studier i den svenska läkarkårens identiteter, 
intressen och ideal 1890-1960. Vol. 216, Linköping Studies in Arts and Science. 
Linköping. 
Fåhræus, Robin. 1950. Läkekonstens historia, del III. Stockholm: Bonniers. 
Haynes, R. Brian, P. J. Devereaux, and Gordon H. Guyatt. 2002. "Clinical expertise in the 
era of evidence-based medicine and patient choice."  Evidince-Based Medicine 7 
(2):36-38. 
Haynes, R. Brian, David L. Sackett, J.A. Muir Gray, D.J. Cook, and Gordon Guyatt. 1996. 
"Transferring evidence from research into practice: 1. The role of clinical care 
research evidence in clinical decisions."  Evidence-Based Medicine 1 (7):196-198. 
Hont, Gabor. 2009. "Svensk sjukvårds nestor Lars Werkö död."  Läkartidningen 106 
(42):2672. 
Howick, Jeremy. 2011. The Philosophy of Evidence-Based Medicine, BMJ Books: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
Ling, Sofia. 2004. Kärringmedicin och vetenskap. Edited by Torkel Jansson, Jan 
Lindegren and Maria Ågren. Vol. 212, Studia Historica Upsaliensa. Uppsala: Acta 
Universitatis Upsaliensis. 
Lääkäriliitto. 2014. Läkarens etiska regler. Finland: Lääkäriliitto. 
Persson, Johannes, and Lena Wahlberg. 2015. "Vår erfarenhet av beprövad erfarenhet: 
några begreppsprofiler och ett verktyg för precisering."  Läkartidningen 112 (49). 
Porter, Roy. 1995. Disease, Medicine and Society in England 1550-1860. 2nd edition ed: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Pye-Smith, Philip H. 1900. "Medicine as a Science and Medicine as an Art."  The Boston 
Medical and Surgical Journal 143 (8):173-177. doi: 
doi:10.1056/NEJM190008231430801. 
Rosenberg, William, and Anna Donald. 1995. "Evidence based medicine: an approach to 
clinical problem-solving."  BMJ 310:1122-1126. 
28 
Saarni, Samuli, ed. 2006. Medicinsk etik. 6 upplagan ed. Helsingfors: Finlands 
Läkarförbund. 
Sackett, David L., William M.C. Rosenberg, J.A. Muir Gray, R. Brian Haynes, and W. 
Scott Richardson. 1996. "Evidence based medicine: what it is and what it isn't."  
BMJ 312:71-72. 
Sackett, David L., Sharon E. Straus, W. Scott Richardson, William Rosenberg, and R. 
Brian Haynes. 2000. Evidence-Based Medicine: How to Practice and Teach EBM. 
Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone. 
Stolt, Carl-Magnus. 1994. Den beprövade erfarenheten: Medicinsk idéhistoria och 
läkekonst i Boråsbygden 1780-1900. Borås: Norma. 
Stoyanov, Drozdstoj St., Peter K. Machamer, and Kenneth F. Shaffner. 2012. "Rendering 
clinical psychology an evidence-based scientific discipline: a case study."  Journal 
of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18:149-154. 
Sveriges_Psykologförbund. 1998. Yrkesetiska principer för psykologer i Norden. edited by 
Sveriges Psykologförbunds kongress 1998. 
Sønbø Kristiansen, Ivar, and Gavin Mooney. 2004. Evidence-Based Medicine – in its 
place: Routledge. 
Werkö, Lars, Kjell Asplund, Peter Aspelin, Mona Britton, Mats Eliasson, Jean-Luc af 
Geijerstam, and Sten Thelander. 2002. "Två år med EBM i Läkartidningen: Klinisk 
forskning och rutinsjukvård har närmat sig varandra."  Läkartidningen 99 
(36):3478-3482. 
 
